Coming Soon - The
EU’s Ministry of Truth?
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By Brian Mooney
The EU27’s leaders
recently met to map out a post-Brexit future. The Commission’s briefing was
strong on promoting the EU and in particular combating ‘disinformation’.
WHAT IS ‘DISINFORMATION’?
The Commission effectively defines disinformation as ‘verifiably false or misleading information
that is created, presented and disseminated to intentionally deceive the public
– weakening their faith in institutions and established political processes’.
There is no doubt that this means EU institutions, as a separate document
offers ‘challenging the EU’s democratic
legitimacy’ as an example.
The definition excludes satire, parody or clearly
identified partisan news and commentary, so tub-thumping opinion pieces by
Frederic Forsyth or Nigel Farage might not be caught.
Reporting errors are out of scope. The EU’s high ground
in claiming ‘responsibility to safeguard EU citizens'
right to factual, objective and
reliable information’ is somewhat
undermined by the briefing – ‘Telling the EU’s story in a more engaging
and emotive way is a more effective means of communication than one restricted
to factual, evidence-based arguments only…. A policy or political priority that
is not explained and underpinned by examples and emotions is unlikely to be
embraced in the same way’. The Commission strongly believes that emotive
storytelling works.
So –
don’t expect a cool, impartial and dispassionate response to claims that the EU
is not a democracy. But who decides what is ‘fact’ or ‘disinformation’ and is
to act on it?
THINK OF A PROBLEM, THINK OF A
SOLUTION…
A clue
is in the context in which the EU sees ‘disinformation’.
Disinformation campaigns, in
particular by third countries, are ‘often
part of hybrid warfare, involving cyber-attacks and hacking of networks’.
This concept even spans economic, diplomatic and subversive activity
that can be used by others (not necessarily states) while remaining below the
threshold of formally declared warfare.
Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to
control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct can be
vehicles for hybrid threats.
Although
the finger is often pointed at
‘Russian sources aiming to suppress
turnout and influence voter preference’, the EU moans ‘Domestic political actors often adopted the tactics and narratives used
by Russian sources to attack the EU and its values’. (Gasp! The EU is obviously out
to lionise grass-roots Eurosceptics?).
This in spite of the EU admitting that there is no evidence
of a distinct cross-border disinformation campaign from external sources
specifically targeting the recent European Parliament elections. Sir Nick
Clegg, now of social media giant Facebook, agrees.
Several EU bodies and initiatives are involved in
counter-offensive, not least the EU’s Foreign Office (EEAS). There is a network of ‘independent fact checkers’
covering 14 Member States, a European Regulators Group covering audio-visuals,
and a network of national election authorities.
The media, including
notably investigative journalists, are already being cultivated via an online
media literacy library and learning centre, and the EU wants targeted campaigns for the public and
training for media and public opinion shapers.
In line with the
new audio-visual media services directive, Member States will have to bolster media literacy measures. The EU is
already eying ‘improving citizens' media
literacy to understand how to spot and fend off disinformation’.
All this is going to be resource-intensive,
not least if the EU is to have software to mine, organise and analyse vast
amounts of digital data. Big Data meets Big Brother?
‘A EUROPE
THAT PROTECTS’ – OR CONTROLS?
This is all supposed to be about protecting our European
democracy from disinformation and manipulation. Funny, I didn’t hear the EU
complain about Barack Obama or IMF interference in the 2016 referendum or a
disingenuous opinion poll claiming record support for the EU, (ironically pushed
by the Evening Standard, which is owned by a Russian).
As well as providing
more funds, Member States are
expected to beef up their own capabilities;
the EU Action Plan seeks the mobilisation
of all parts of government (including cybersecurity, intelligence,
data protection, and law enforcement authorities).
This in spite of an
earlier note that it only targets ‘disinformation
that is legal under EU or
national law’!!!
It remains to be seen how much
cash-strapped Member States will cough up; on average, the threat level is assessed as
being medium to low.
However should
progress not be satisfactory, the Commission threatens further initiatives, including
possibly legislation for online media companies.
The campaigners I’ve known over the years stick to the
facts and use well-referenced sources to back up their assumptions on less
clear topics. There is so much wrong with the EU that there is absolutely no
case for making things up and damaging one’s credibility as truth will out.
They will continue to show the EU up as it is.
My concern is more for journalists and content editors,
often pushed for time, inexperienced and rarely expert in EU matters. If leaned
on, they might be more likely to slavishly stick to official EU press releases
etc, which are quite propagandistic, or to defer to the opinions of the EU’s
retained ‘fact-checkers’, who might be even less expert?
What if an editor rejected fact-checker influencers and
let controversial but evidenced content stand? Would they then be charged with
intentionally disseminating misleading material?
Conversely, the more blatantly pro-EU media can expect an
easier time? To paraphrase George Orwell, ‘he who controls the news, controls the future’. We have
a fight on our hands.
Footnote:
The Campaign for an Independent Britain’s pamphlet “A HOUSE DIVIDED - Can Parliament serve two masters: the
Nation and the European Union?” was published soon after the 2010 election. On
p14 see:
“FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS
The unelected EU Commission has
signalled its intent to control all press and media by issuing an EU press
card. They will decide who can and cannot be a journalist. A 16 page document
has already been issued, telling the EU press corps how it should and should
not report the EU. Following an angry response from journalists, this was
quickly withdrawn - but only from the public domain. It is waiting its turn to
be reintroduced.
This may initially be on a
“voluntary” basis but its power will be steadily strengthened over time until
it could well become impossible to operate as a journalist without an EU press
card. The Commission also aspires to control the internet, websites and
blogging.
“Criticism of the EU is akin to
blasphemy and may be restricted without affecting freedom of speech”
- Opinion of Ruiz Jarabo
Colomer, Advocate General of the EU Court of Justice 2000 in Case C-274/99
The Court of First Instance had
previously ruled that “the EU may restrict political speech to protect its
interests”.”
References and links for further information
Key EU documents
‘Europe in May
2019’, European Commission briefing for the informal EU27 leaders' meeting in
Sibiu (Romania) on 9 May 2019
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/comm_sibiu_06-05_en.pdf
Note the ‘Digital Single Market’ heading for an essentially political initiative
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation
Action
Plan against Disinformation, EEAS
JOIN(2018) 36 final
Report
on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation
JOIN(2019) 12 final
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf
Report
of the Presidency to the European Council on 20-21 June 2019, on countering
disinformation and the lessons learnt from the European elections, 10415/19
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10415-2019-INIT/en/pdf
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2914_en.htm
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/election_network_contact_points_5.pdf
Audiovisual Media Services
Directive, 2018 (See Article 33a)
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/audiovisual-media-services
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2018-INIT/en/pdf
NB this Directive updates
the 2010 Directive
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32010L0013
George Orwell
‘1984’ original quote
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-does-that-quote-mean-archaeology-172300
Sir Nick Clegg and
Facebook
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48740231
President Obama and
IMF interference (2016)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36117907
Evening Standard, Ipsos
MORI poll ‘record support for
EU membership’ [sic], 19.6.15
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/we-want-to-stay-in-eu-voters-tell-pm-10331462.html
EU dedicated
website on disinformation
A Europe that
Protects: The EU steps up action against disinformation (PR)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6647_en.htm
Final report, High
Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG)
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271 (PDF)
“recognition that
information can rarely be neatly categorized as simply true or false
…
biased and polarising content is
often sophisticated and hard for verification systems to detect as it
increasingly splices truth and fiction and circulates in hard-to-track formats.”
Professor Chris
Marsden and Dr Trisha Meyer
https://www.scl.org/articles/10425-how-can-the-law-regulate-removal-of-fake-news
“The digitisation of disinformation is blamed
for skewing the results of elections and referenda and amplifying hate speech. [HLEG's] De Cock Buning has argued that at least in
France and Italy in the period to 2018 “fake news is having a minimal direct
impact. Its effect is limited mostly to groups of ‘believers’ seeking to
reinforce their own opinions and prejudices” We agree that evidence of
large-scale harm is still inconclusive in Europe…”
….
The UK Parliament AI Committee reported on
some of these issues in 2017. There are an enormous number of false positives
in taking material down. Human intervention is necessary to analyse these false
positives, that could lead to over-censorship of
legitimate content that is machine-labelled incorrectly as disinformation.”
(Cites UK House of
Lords (2017) AI Select Committee: AI Report Published
Wider EU
programmes linked to counteraction
On face value,
Creative Europe (arts/culture) does not seem closely related
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_Europe
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/about_en
Connecting Europe
Facility (infrastructure)
https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility
Horizon 2020 (R&D)
https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/horizon-2020
Criticism of EU
compared as ‘akin to Blasphemy’ incident
Lord Monson, HL Deb
27 November 2000 vol 619 cc1108-11 1108, § 2.58 p.m.
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/2000/nov/27/criticism-of-the-eu
Annex: EU Action on Disinformation – base of
text from original sources
Emphasis from original texts typically left
in; key points highlighted in
red
Introduction
The topic of Disinformation
has been rising in priority over last 5 years. It features heavily in ‘Europe in
May 2019’, the European Commission's briefing for the informal EU27 leaders'
meeting in Sibiu (Romania) on 9 May 2019
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/comm_sibiu_06-05_en.pdf
Definition and Context
Report on the
implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation
JOIN(2019) 12 final
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf
The
Commission defines disinformation as ‘verifiably false or misleading information that is created,
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the
public, and may cause public harm. Disinformation does not include reporting
errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and
commentary’(COM(2018)236). The aim of disinformation is to distract and divide,
to plant seeds of doubt by distorting and falsifying facts, thus confusing
people and weakening their faith in institutions and
established political processes.
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation
Disinformation is
verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated
for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public. It may have
far-reaching consequences, cause public harm, be a threat to democratic
political and policy-making processes, and may even put the protection of EU
citizens' health, security and their environment at risk.
Disinformation
erodes trust in institutions and in digital and traditional media and harms our
democracies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions. It
can polarise debates, create or deepen tensions in society and undermine
electoral systems, and have a wider impact on European security. It impairs
freedom of opinion and expression, a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
JOIN(2018)
36 final Action Plan against
Disinformation, EEAS
…
The actions
contained in this Action Plan only target disinformation content that is legal under Union or national law.
…
Disinformation campaigns, in particular by third
countries, are often part of hybrid warfare, involving cyber-attacks and
hacking of networks
(‘hybrid’ - linked to other threats to EU,
e.g. cyber-attacks, terrorism)
While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain
flexible to respond to their evolving nature, the concept captures the
mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional
methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used
in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific
objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.
There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target
and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media
to control the political narrative or to
radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles
for hybrid threats. See JOIN(2016) 18.
Impact
Report
of the Presidency to the European Council on 20-21 June 2019, on countering
disinformation and the lessons learnt from the European elections, 10415/19
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10415-2019-INIT/en/pdf
[In Member States] On
average, the perception
of the threat level in society is
assessed as being medium to low.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2914_en.htm
…it is still too early to draw final conclusions about the level and
impact of disinformation in the recent European Parliament elections,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf
At
this point in time, available evidence has not allowed to identify a distinct cross-border
disinformation campaign from external sources specifically targeting the
European elections.
However, the evidence collected revealed a continued and sustained
disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming to suppress turnout and
influence voter preferences. These covered a broad range of topics, ranging
from challenging the Union’s democratic legitimacy to exploiting
divisive public debates on issues such as of migration and sovereignty. This
confirms that the disinformation campaigns deployed by state and non-state
actors5 pose a hybrid threat to the EU.
There was a
consistent trend of malicious actors using disinformation to promote extreme
views and polarise local debates, including through unfounded attacks on the
EU. Domestic political actors often adopted the tactics and narratives used by
Russian sources to attack the EU and its values6. Other external actors were
also involved.
…
The
tactics used by these actors are evolving as quickly as the measures adopted by
states and online platforms. Instead of conducting large-scale operations on
digital platforms, these actors, in particular linked to Russian sources, now
appeared to be opting for smaller-scale, localised operations that are harder
to detect and expose.
Given the
increasingly sophisticated nature of disinformation activities, and the
difficulties of independent researchers to access relevant data from the
platforms, a conclusive assessment of the scope and impact of disinformation
campaigns will take time and require a concerted effort by civil society,
academia, public actors and online platforms.
Action
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/comm_sibiu_06-05_en.pdf
In order
to continue fighting the increasing flow of disinformation, Member States and
institutions need to team up to build on existing synergies and pool resources.
Together, Member States and EU institutions need to make sure that the new
rapid alert system is fully exploited. Going beyond information sharing, a
real knowledge community with expertise on the different facets of
disinformation is needed, drawing insights from research and academia,
fact-checkers, online platforms, technology experts and international partners.
The Commission is ready to link up the expertise of its Network against
Disinformation with the rapid alert system and provide a hub for EU policy
related content to counter disinformation.
The
Commission intends to facilitate the creation of a European multidisciplinary community to foster
cooperation between all involved, in particular independent fact-checkers and
academic researchers involved in the fight against disinformation. To this end, the Commission
plans to establish a European Platform on Disinformation. The Platform will
scale up collaboration between fact-checkers and academic researchers in order
to ensure full coverage of the Union territory and facilitate the build-up and
interconnection of relevant national organisations, including national
disinformation centres.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf
In
line with the new audio-visual media services directive, Member
States will have to bolster media literacy measures in their national
frameworks, in close cooperation with regulators and other stakeholders.
…
The
International Fact-Checking Network created a European branch of independent
fact checkers covering 14 Member States and launched a website in 11 EU
languages. The Commission will continue to facilitate the creation of a
European multidisciplinary community of independent fact checkers and academic
researchers.
[Note: a new project under Horizon
2020 was launched in November 2018 to create the Social Observatory for
Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA), which 14 European
fact-checking organisations have already joined.
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10415-2019-INIT/en/pdf ]
…
The
Connecting Europe Facility will also provide funding (EUR 2.5 million) for a
new digital service infrastructure aimed at networking fact checkers and
researchers.
…
Improved coordination of election authorities: The election networks
consisting of authorities with competence relevant to electoral context,
established in cooperation with Member States, led to increased preparedness
for possible threats and better coordination of activities at national and EU
level before the elections. Their activities included identification of
threats and gaps, crisis preparedness, awareness-raising campaigns, efforts to
counter disinformation,
monitoring and enforcement of applicable rules and analyses of applicable
national laws and procedures.
….
This requires a joint
effort of EU institutions and Member States and includes the need for adequate
human and financial resources to better detect, analyse and expose
disinformation campaigns and raising preparedness to address disinformation
campaigns at EU and national level. The private sector,
in particular online platforms, have a particular responsibility in tackling
disinformation.
….
The Commission and
the High Representative are committed to continue their joint efforts to protect our European democracy from disinformation and
manipulation. It is our shared responsibility to safeguard EU citizens'
right to factual, objective and reliable
information.
…
Before
the end of the year, the Commission will assess the effectiveness of the Code
[Code of Practice on Disinformation for online platforms and industry ]
following its initial 12-months implementation period. Should the results of
this assessment not be satisfactory, the Commission may propose further
initiatives, including of a regulatory nature.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/election_network_contact_points_5.pdf
NB
Permanent Representation to the EU was the UK contact point for election
cooperation network!
JOIN(2018)
36 final Action Plan against
Disinformation, EEAS
Prompt reaction
via fact-based and effective communication is essential to counter and deter
disinformation, including in cases of disinformation concerning Union matters
and policies. This is
important to foster an open, democratic debate free
from manipulation,
JOIN(2018)
36 final Action Plan against
Disinformation, EEAS
This Action Plan
answers the European Council’s call for measures to “protect the Union’s democratic systems and combat disinformation”
…
Threats affecting
democracy in any Member State can harm the Union as a whole.
…
Addressing
disinformation requires political determination and unified action, mobilising all parts of governments (including counter-hybrid, cybersecurity,
intelligence and strategic communication communities, data protection,
electoral, law enforcement and media authorities).
…
To
address effectively the threat of disinformation, it is necessary to reinforce
the Strategic Communication Task Forces of the European External Action
Service, the Union Delegations and the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell by providing them
with additional specialised staff, such as experts in data mining and analysis
to process the relevant data. It is also important to contract additional
media monitoring services to cover a wider range of sources and languages and
additional research and studies on the reach and impact of disinformation.
In addition, there is a need to invest in analytical tools such as dedicated
software to mine, organise and aggregate vast amounts of digital data.
…
Member States
should complement and support
the actions of the Union institutions by increasing their national capabilities and by supporting
the necessary increases in resources for the Union institutions.
….
The Emergency
Response Coordination Centre is set up under Article 7 of Decision 1313/2013/EU
on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
…
The European
Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media Services comprises all the relevant
regulators of all the Member States. It provides technical advice to the
Commission in a number of fields related to the application of the Directive,
facilitates cooperation among the national regulatory authorities
…
a Union online
media literacy library and learning centre as well as other media literacy
tools
…
Building resilience
also includes specialised trainings, public conferences and debates as well as other forms of common learning for the media. It also
involves empowering all sectors of society and, in particular, improving citizens' media literacy to understand how to spot and
fend off disinformation.
…
but also to the
longer term, the Commission and the High Representative, in cooperation with
the Member States, will organise targeted campaigns for
the public and trainings for media and public opinion shapers in the
Union and its neighbourhood to raise awareness of the negative effects of
disinformation. Efforts to support the work of independent media and quality
journalism as well as the research into disinformation will be continued in
order to provide a comprehensive response to this phenomenon.
…
The Commission
funds the project "openmediahub" to: (i) provide journalists in the
neighbourhood with the necessary skills for independent and objective
reporting; (ii) improve the skills of the editorial staff and (iii) reinforce
the network of media professionals and journalists in the neighbourhood.
…
The work of
independent media is essential for the functioning of a democratic society. The Commission will therefore continue to
support independent media and investigative journalists, as they contribute to the exposure of disinformation.
….
The Creative Europe
programme, if adopted, will help reinforce Europe’s news media sector,
diversity and pluralism of journalistic content, as well as a critical approach
to media content through media literacy, COM (2018) 438.
…
The Commission has
proposed funding for the development of new tools to better understand and
combat online disinformation in its proposal for Horizon Europe programme.
Corollary – Objectivity of EU
Communications?
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/comm_sibiu_06-05_en.pdf
[Communication]
must be factual – while also appealing to emotions,
backed up with data – and adapted to the target audience, in clear language.
Communication
should start from our shared values and then focus on what the concrete results
of EU policies are for people where they live, and support community building*.
…
A
policy or political priority that is not explained and underpinned by examples and emotions is unlikely to be embraced in
the same way by the citizens it involves and affects. Telling the EU’s story in a more engaging and emotive way
is a more effective means of communication than one restricted to factual,
evidence-based arguments only.
…
The
experience of the corporate campaigns during this Commission has shown the strong impact in reaching
citizens with emotive storytelling and tailored messaging for different Member States and
regions.
…
Online
platforms have become powerful information gateways, where the gatekeepers have
financial interests in servicing the users with customised information.
While
this environment makes it easier for citizens to interact and express their
political views, thus contributing to the healthy functioning of democratic
societies, it also allows the rapid spread of harmful disinformation that seeks
to disrupt democratic processes. Evidence shows that foreign state actors are
also increasingly deploying disinformation strategies to influence societal
debates, create divisions and interfere in democratic decision-making
…
The
[media] platforms must now take their fair share of responsibility for ensuring
free and unbiased
speech in Europe.